DRAFT

Human rights are moral principles or norms. This simple proposition has granted human rights extensive powers of objectivity and universalism as either a standard of morality or the standard of behaviour. This makes it an effective tool for argumentation and appeals to human rights are frequently used but rarely defined. It has become a catch all for any issue that has its roots in humanitarian, moral or ethical or legal legitimacy. Claims resting in human rights principle are hard to rationally assert and harder to contest. Despite this ambiguity, or perhaps because of it, the use of human rights has become an important tool. The thread of human rights has existed arguably as long as the conception of humanity and have been critical in shaping modern institutions and their respective societies. This culminating in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has created the contemporary norms and notions of these rights. Thus the coherence and efficacy of human rights in law are imperative to laying the foundations of ‘right’ and cooperation even at international levels. The purpose of this paper is to explore the connections between rights and institutions and examine the consequences of this relationship. In doing so this paper will attempt to evaluate the relationship between human rights and international and domestic legal institutions. Further, this paper aims to examine the coherence of human rights reasoning and its subsequent complication within this relationship with institutions. To this end this paper focuses this investigation in three parts.

Emergence of Rights and Institutions : The basis of rights is a feature of human institutions. This is a fundamental feature of the emergence of ‘humanity’. The first aspect is the conception of considering where rights arise. In doing so this will establish a framework that is appropriate to best understand these rights and human rights relationships to them. Further this will reveal the purpose and uncover the most basic assumption of human rights without defining a rigid conception of a human right. These assumptions are valuable in determining their coherence.

Developing of Human Rights: The basis of human rights as a feature of theory and politics. These assumptions can then be attempted to be rationalised through theoretical justifications. A comparative normative analysis of human rights amongst various theories of justification and interpretation. This shows the development of human rights in context of the developing institutions and the many challenges. This will elucidate the stability of the assumptions in creating a coherent basis and further their construction and application.

Constructing Human Rights: The basis of human rights as rule and reasons. What is the content and application of human rights as they apply to law and whether they produce coherent outcomes. An evaluation of the conflicts and complements using law within the legal framework and the benefits and detriment of implicating human rights within the international legal sphere

It is the assertion of this paper that no coherent system of human rights can be justified or constructed. This is due to the assumption required to achieve the intended function of human rights being universality and equality, principles at odds. Further normative construction aimed at the self containment of these features through reason are at odds of the emergent systems of rights. This incoherence is directly in violation with the principle of law and reason.

Emergence of Rights and Humanity

The Institution of Humanity

The idea of a human right is dependent on the classification of such a category. Humans as species have existed for millennia with archaeological evidence indication for at least 300,000 years. The earliest behaviorally similar humans emerging 70,000 - 100,000 years ago. This distinction of human and the causes of such features is an area of ambiguity by this period known as the cognitive revolution. A contemporarily significant result or cause factor in this emerging humanity was the ability to invent “institutions”. A simple definition of institutions can be construed as a "humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions". While all animals both act in cooperative and competitive manner, humanity is distinct in the invention of novel forms of regulation. The ability of language to be symbolically expanded allowed for the more numerous and complex interaction and transmission of ideas. This has been attributed to the creation of fiction. Fictions are not false statements but self contained universes of assertions that convey meaning unto themselves, giving form to something that does not or may not exist. Fictions are important in this regard as all expectations are in essence merely belief. The shared belief in fiction mediated the creation of institutions creating a uniformity of expectations. This methodology flourished as cooperation reduced competition and this epoch marked the carving out of humanity from nature. An early adoption of these shared fictions was through the use of religious mythologies. Importantly this developed independently developed globally in major religions uber. The first iteration of this ideal is known as the golden rule: it states "One must do unto others as one would want to be done to themselves". Tied closely to the ethic of reciprocity, it establishes reciprocal recognition, the first foundation of 'humanity' and protection of individual rights of 'humans' under a mutual interest in self preservation but fails to set recognisable expectations. This precept elucidates how the basic requirement of an effective institution is built on a fiction that is mutually recognised as authority between its participants. Those who do not recognise the source of justification thus pose an existential threat to the fiction. To supplement the need for mutual recognition fiction aimed to draw their authority independently from in laws those that are “universal, fundamental and inalienable” to those who recognize this authority. This enables the effective imposition on competitive actors not sharing this belief as justified under this cooperative agreement. This formulation is heavily rooted in the notion of natural law, a universal law independent of human institutions and individual agency.

The Fictions of Universality

Universal ethical standards were introduced to supplement the need of university. Plato developed an early standard of this ethic casting principles that could extract value from behaviours from authority of natural laws of ‘god, nature, or reason’, hence asserting the natural right. This illustrates the institution of human rights early reliance on universal authority where other modes of interpretation are incorrect or through conviction of recognition where others are seen as competition, both as a threat to the fiction. Both compete to secure a source of authority through fiction if universality. Echoed by early natural rights theorists Thomas Aquinas. “[T]hat which is correct in the works of justice … is constituted by a reference to the other person. It is the case therefore, that in our works, what responds to the other, according to the demands of a certain equality aequalitatem is what is called justum” the universal fictions are inherently asserted as intrinsically self contained and coherent, inclusive of all elements requisite for justification of the truth of its statements. This at the explicit exclusion of all other fiction necessarily as competitive or false. Embedding these values in university was the creation of the ‘other’.

In the 17th century, Hobbes posited a contractualist theory of legal positivism in his seminal work the Leviathan. Building on observation of early implementations of institution would arise independently and indefinitely with the rise of social order. He proposed that in the absence of a human institution of 'commonwealth' individuals exist in a 'state of nature'. In a constant state of competition with such an environment, with other individuals making up a part of this. A rational person, however, would see the utility in cooperation and be willing to sacrifice their freedom of competition to cooperate in a shared fiction to further both individuals' interests, thus social tendencies are merely a manifestation of self-preservation and the rights granted under this self-organisation. This had the effect of tying the natural rights to the individuals in a universal interest of cooperation as an institution. However this is necessarily determined by universal assumption of rationality as a feature of humanity. Thus, embedding the concept of a ‘state’ as the universal foil to the ‘other’ state of nature. However, this clearly fails to be truly universal with regards to human recognition without ‘irrational’ and ‘uncooperative’ others being deemed a mere part of the environment which the state institution competes with. The existence and participation in the state securing an individual's natural rights.

However, this conception soon became extended to include the incorporating of the state as a part of the individuals' state of nature as the focus of philosophy moved away from national collectivism but to civil liberalism. Locke reversed the Hobbesian prescription of competition with nature, imputing the state as part of this nature and asserting where an institution went against natural law and failed to protect "life, liberty, and property," individuals had the natural right to overthrow and replace this institution. These contemporary derivations of natural law became a catalyst for major political revolution, thus tying the ideals within the very foundation of their law. The French revolution emblazoned in the motto of the fifth republic "Liberte, egalite, fraternity" as the "droits de l'homme". And in 1776, the United States Declaration of Independence declared that "all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness". Further cementing the authority of natural law as a guarantee of freedom from the state of nature and the state as an object of universal necessity. The right to self-determination, in this the right to legal recognition through association.

This universal fiction requires universal recognition or reason. These philosophical approaches recognised that freedom was the exclusive suggestion of the individual to natural law under a pure complete state of nature of anarchy. This state was inherently hazardous as the one was the individual with every other as a competing force and potentially hazardous, by giving up that complete freedom for cooperation under a system of shared fictions easily adopted and shared in recognition under a social contract potentially reducing the risk of living. The Recognition of rights expectation is what gives rights to their authority, whether it be individual or through institutions. This harkens to the abstraction of ‘other’ as a necessity to secure and justify the existence of either. Reciprocal recognition was no longer individually required but through the filter a collective ideal of ‘other’. These differences are muted in order to create a uniform shared fiction and with the principle of equality becoming the enforcement of shared fiction founding the institution it inevitably creates. Institutions cannot exist without participants, likewise participants cannot exist unburdened in institutions. The enforcement of a fiction independent of both institutional or individual recognition necessitated rights based on a principle of universality.

The creation of the inter-institutional bodies was justified in a universal fiction over and between institutions. This revived the idea that these rights were independent of any ideology of collective or individual. They created the most recognisable and fundamental document in human rights the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 'declaration' again restating human rights in natural rights, rather than a characteristic of being recognised in protections within a nation. It became one of the foundational documents outlining the acclaimed natural rights of humans. The issue of human rights became less philosophical and more practical. To ensure; 'the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world' being 'recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.' "Dignity" is a key term for the discussion of human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not justify its claims on any philosophical basis, but rather it simply appeals to human dignity. This lacks the clarity and authority in defining the concept of the 'human' to be recognised. Again this creates this dogma of objective natural rights and granting itself authority by its universal objectiveness. Built on the fiction of shared humanity and common human dignity. This interestingly creates new institutions independent of individual or state actors.

The Implication of Institution and Fiction

Rights cannot exist outside of an institutional fiction. They do not exist in isolation but rather through the reduction of ‘others’ and ‘other as the same’, and ‘wrongs’ and ‘rights’. This precept precludes the imputation of equality and universality into the formation of human rights. Equality is created through the uniform expectations and recognition of this fiction in forming institutions of rights. In the absence of recognition universality is required. The construction of a universal right requires a universal fiction that is necessarily at the exclusion of difference. These two principles are fundamentally at odds. Further institutions cannot exist with recognition. Where recognition is required, the more universal a fiction the more individual it becomes and the more equal, more institutional and exclusive.. The justification of is what institutions of human rights derive its authority and with it the ability to recognise and enforce these rights. The source of universality ultimately informs whether these rights are an institutional phenomena or individual phenomena and the form they take as claims. Regardless of justification of human rights, the mere act of imputing them with justification creates the construction of the rights. Fundamentally, these assumptions as any are susceptible to criticism but are necessary in forming the basis of conceptual clarity.

Constructing Human Rights

Within the discussion of human rights, many issues are attributable to a difference in interpretation; this includes even basic definitions of what is a 'Human Right' or even what is ‘human’ or ‘right’. They are what have been called 'essentially contested concepts'. This also creates a telescoping effect as each layer of abstraction exponentially creates more possible interpretations. This idea of an essentially contested subject is an important issue within human rights discourse and will become a frequent theme. Definitions are abstracted and manipulated to suit particular interests and agendas. With the construction of a universality the determination of the content of human rights follows. These interpretations are built out of the holding of fundamental assumptions required for consensus on concepts. Either through universal reason or recognition. The conflict between equality and universality informs the balancing act of whether these form positive or negative obligations between actors and the balancing act of principes.

Ethical Conscriptions: Universal Reason

These ethical rules are important as they, like human rights, present first-order universal and near objective criteria to categories human behaviour and choices and their moral legitimacy. To gain this universal status, ethical arguments are used to rationalise such features in a self-contained manner. Thus not being subject to external influence of interpretation. The limitation to participation in this is the presupposition of rationality as a feature of moral agents. Through the use of ethical reasoning and normative logic, many theories attempt to reconcile these differences and achieve moral justification as well as universality through an objective lens of normative analysis.

Utilitarianism

Is a moral normative theory that asserts the value of a decision is congruent to its effect on utility. through minimising the loss of utility the "sum welfare of individuals, which is measured in units of pleasure and or pain". The main contention is the construction of the utility function, which requires subjective moral assumptions to be implied in the absence of a universal interest "a set of interests held in common by all members of the community in the realisation of which each member has a distinct and positive share". The constructing of a universal interest can be defined by three features. A universal interest requires absolute recognition of a uniform benefit. This can create a positive obligation through obliging an increase in utility or may create negative obligations to avoid utility deleterious actions. In its lowest form it acknowledges that there is a shared capacity of necessity is a binding theme and a shared feature with natural law. This reinforces an norm based approach of human rights and an institutional form of right.

Deontology

In contrast with Utilitarianism, deontology considers the rules and the rights and duties of another person. This approach is more receptive to the standards formulation of human rights. Deontological theory is more concerned with decision making based on a set of universal rules. Determined these universal rules prescriptions are made. In this way this supports the notion that a fiction must be self-contained, an example of these limitations of rule that are the Categorical Imperatives. The categorical imperative is designed to be determinative in the categorisation of rules imperatives. Such an imperative is the obligation to "Act only according to that maxim by which you can also will that it would become a universal law”. This reversal of the role of nature of perhaps the expansion of the environment to include the artificial human environment of the state has been echoed by academics using an agency based justification. This “the agent must logically accept that all other prospective purposive agents have the same rights to freedom and well-being as he claims for himself.” Through this it imputes recognition with self-determination and the individual construction of human rights.

Political Conscription: Universal Recognition

These normative justifications still require a sufficient degree of interpretation due to the existence of fictions of abstract notions that are ‘essentially contested’. They fail to create a self contained universe of axioms that is truly universal. Where these ethical justifications are employed; they require further imputations of assumptions that are inherently political in nature. Attempts to create a coherent narrative universal interest through the means of institution imputes their politics ends. Conversely, the models of individual interests require the setting of universal standards which thus can be leveraged on others. This pragmatic realization of human rights elevated the importance of the institution in lack of an objective standard. The sentiments were echoed during the transition from the institutions holding authority through a universal right to rule as the divine right of god. "the pretended right of these theorists are all extremes; and in a proportion, as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false". The transition to a universal reason to universal recognition being implicated in these revolutions as an effective means of institutional rights enforcement through this cooperation. The question of human rights to the polity to which it aims to implicate are inherently political. This was criticised early "What is the use of discussing a man's abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon the method of procuring and administering them." Reflecting the fundamental theories of the state of nature in reverse as the “the ‘Rights of Man’ are for those people who do not have access to them.” Thus outlining the political incoherence of a human rights construction.

The interpretation that outlines the inherent institutional nature of these rights and theories the dependence on such. The limitation of association being the cooperation of the individual and the institutions. This political feature is emphasised even in political theories disregarding the invention of human rights citing it as the enforcement of bourgeois ideology. “Above all, we note the fact that the so-called rights of man, the droits de l'homme as distinct from the droits du citoyen, are nothing but the rights of a member of civil society – i.e., the rights of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community.” Outlining the political paradox of human rights as a battle of reconciling the ‘others’ and ‘others as the same’. "In short, the other is welcomed insofar as its presence is not intrusive, insofar as it is not really the other. Tolerance thus coincides with its opposite." The process of denaturalization through the removal of revoking of citizenship under the guise of equality. This is reflected in the statement that has been posited as a fundamental minimalist construction of rights as the right to have rights. “We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community”.

Universal Rule of Paradox

Both modes of justification suffer from a crisis of coherence. Where ethical claims this manifests as a crisis of completeness. Where political claims are made there is the crisis of cooperation. The equal right to be recognised with the right to recognise our own values paradoxically devaluing values. “If every possible human rights element is deemed to be essential or necessary, then nothing will be treated as though it is truly important.” Without othering the self-coherence of a system fails. Pragmatically, human rights fails to create a universal standard strong enough to be self-contained. This moral paradox is summed up by Neitsches sentiment that “our morality is”, in fact, “by its own standards, poisonously immoral”. Thus at a conceptual level the construction of human rights is fundamentally incoherent.

Human Rights as Rule

Rule of Law

The rule of law is a vehicle for the promotion and protection of a common normative framework. Law and the ideals of human rights are interconnected at a fundamental level by ‘institution’. Thus whatever conception of human rights its implication in law must be reflected in their institutions. But in what context are they framed and to what extent are these models compatible. This is significant as the role of law in the rule of law established as the normative imperative of legal systems outlines that the law must be "understood and accessible"; this is essential to enable its proper execution. This implication of the interdependence of human rights and the rule of law is recognised by the UN. This right to rule is reflected in this inherent need. for the “if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law”. This demonstrates the prominence of the rule of law even on the institutions that declare recognition of this self-determination.. In practice the At an international level the rule of law also extends to the body's issue and regulating the current framework of international human rights.

Contents of the Rule of Law

The rule of law is a national narrative rather than a narrative of humanity. This anchors the rule of law in its national context. The rule of law is a guarantor of legitimacy of rule. However, due to its contextual interpretation this notion has also become an essentially contested concept. Its guiding function to prevent the unintended use of legal institutions and promote specific values such as liberty and other democratic notions. The most primitive interpretations of the rule of law being "all are equal in law" as any exceptions to the rule of law would discredit its primacy as an objective and universal source of law. Three identified principles which together establish the rule of law:

• the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law
• equality before the law
• The law of the constitution is a consequence of the rights of individuals Hayek provides a good foundation for the framing of the principle need for the rule of law. "Stripped of all technicalities (the ideal of the rule of law) means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand — rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge." The principles that form this body of rule must be coherent to create a existence of a uniform expectation. A lack of coherence on the existence, construction and content of human rights abstractly prevent it from being an effective regulatory force. The Rule of law at its earliest stage of implementation creates a conflict in the authority of human rights. This is “the fundamental challenge to each and every human rights claim … is a demand for reasons.”

Incoherence in Law

The incoherence as law can be demonstrated through The right to life. No better place is this shared narrative in equality developed in but in the right to life. In essence a very basic form of right to recognition and the right to have rights. At a practical level the modern conception of human rights have been taken under the norms of the UDHR to extend that “freedom from want and fear are essential; they are not enough. All human beings have the right to be treated with dignity and respect”. Inherent to this, are the further generations of rights designed to secure its operation as "Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of a person." More specific proclamations followed building on the subsequent rights needed to establish and maintain this dignity. The right to life is an explicit recognition of self determination and the founding of the UNHCR in this justification. This was further emphasised in the international legal framework through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which states: 'Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life

In application this incoherence is best demonstrated through the infinite and ‘fractal ’ nature of their interpretation. Their construction of the abstract noun of life and its protection and further promotion by the empowered nation is where many further human rights spawn enforced through. This also raises concerns over the determination of life, human and the prescribed common normative framework to determine what is and isn't in the best service of achieving that life so rightfully. The Prescription of this common norm or standard is best illustrated in the formerly contradictory systems of liberal democracies. This is a practical system that attempts to reconcile individual conceptions of standard and the collective consensus. This paradoxical situation's implication can be acutely seen when considering the treatment of the fundamental right to life. Further, as with the construction of these rights into negative or positive duties. This can be best demonstrated through the juxtaposition of the arguments relatively, reflecting the attitudes of ‘others’ in principles and of character. Learning to affirm difference rather than sameness to create narratives.

Conclusions

Human Rights is without a doubt an important milestone in human and institutional development. It marks the progress of humanity in its cooperative effort which defines our civilisation in a state of nature. It has helped develop a collective consciousness and allowed for uniformity in discourse. It has also played an important role in developing theories of morality, ethics, politics and philosophy.

Human Rights is an institutional practice with a universal basis in the fiction of equality and recognition. This in contrast with the common notion that rights are universally asserted and held to be right. The fiction of human rights is one that is inherently complete. This recognition is also based on principles of equity and universality which are paradoxically exclusionary. These institutions historically have been intertwined with the state and legal institutions.

Fundamentalist theories of human rights act in concert with normative theories to attempt to reconcile this paradox in values. Theories of human rights are intrinsically flawed relying on assumption mirroring those of human rights, and thus subject to similar incoherence. The utility of this tool for society is only being marked by the political goals of its design. The institutions that are designed in construction of right are philosophically at odds with this politics. Thus the determination of the justification and content of these rights is intrinsically tied with institutional powers and philosophies and the paradox this creates.

With no grand conception coalescing either the role of nature or human rights in conflict with our fundamental understanding of law principle and institutions, primarily between international and domestic conceptions of rights. It also demonstrates the need for contention between domestic and international notions and human rights. However the use as reason fails because of this incoherence and this can be seen in its application in moral, philosophical and legal arguments. Perhaps human rights can be best understood as an ‘agreement to disagree’.

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah, The Origins Of Totalitarianism (Harcourt Brace, 1994) Aston, Phillip, "Ships Passing In The Night: The Current State Of The Human Rights And Development Debate Seen Through The Lens Of The Millennium Development Goals" (2005) 27(3) Human Rights Quarterly Benhabib, Seyla, "The Right To Have Rights”: Hannah Arendt On The Contradictions Of The Nation-State." [2004] The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens Cornides, Jakob, Natural And Unnatural Law (Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, 2010) Declaration Toward A Global Ethic (Parliament of the World’s Religions, 1993) Dicey, A. V and Roger Michener, Introduction To The Study Of The Law Of The Constitution (Liberty/Classics, 1982) Gallie, W. B., "IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts" (1956) 56(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Gewirth, Alan, "The Epistemology Of Human Rights" (1984) 1(2) Social Philosophy and Policy Gross, Barry R., "Human Rights: Essays On Justification And Applications. Alan Gewirth" (1984) 94(2) Ethics Harari, Yuval N, John Purcell and Haim Watzman, Sapiens (2014) Hardwick, Nicola-Ann, "Theoretically Justifying Human Rights: A Critical Analysis" [2012] E-International Relations Hayek, Friedrich August von, The Road To Serfdom (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999) Henshilwood, Christopher S. and Curtis W. Marean, "The Origin Of Modern Human Behavior" (2003) 44(5) Current Anthropology http://10.1086/377665 Hobbes, Thomas, Karl Schuhmann and G. A. J Rogers, Leviathan (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006) Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Clarendon Press, 2012) Jefferson, Thomas, Declaration Of Independence (Applewood Books, 1997). Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork Of The Metaphysic Of Morals (1785) Keith Ansell-Pearson and Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Friedrich Nietzsche On The Genealogy Of Morality (Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1994). Kelsen, Hans and A. Javier Treviño, General Theory Of Law & State (The Lawbook Exchange, 2007) Khosravi, Shahram, "The Right To Have Rights" [2010] 'Illegal' Traveller Lévinas, Emmanuel, Of God Who Comes To Mind (Stanford University Press, 1998) Locke, John and Crawford B Macpherson, Second Treatise Of Government (Hackett, 1980) Marx, Karl, On The Jewish Question (Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1843) Morrison, Andrew, "The Law Is A Fractal: The Attempt To Anticipate Everything" (2012) 292 University of Michigan Public Law Research Paper Murphy, Mark, "The Natural Law Tradition In Ethics" [2019] The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy North, Douglass C, "Institutions" (1991) 5(1) Journal of Economic Perspectives Perry, Michael J, The Idea Of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2000) Poe, Marshall, A History Of Communications (Cambridge University Press, 2011) Postema, Gerald J., "Interests, Universal And Particular: Bentham's Utilitarian Theory Of Value" (2006) 18(2) Utilitas Principe, Michael L., "Albert Venn Dicey And The Principles Of The Rule Of Law: Is Justice Blind? A Comparative Analysis Of The United States And Great Britain" (2000) 357 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review Scerri, Eleanor M.L. et al, "Did Our Species Evolve In Subdivided Populations Across Africa, And Why Does It Matter?" (2018) 33(8) Trends in Ecology & Evolution Benhabib, Seyla, "The Right To Have Rights”: Hannah Arendt On The Contradictions Of The Nation-State." [2004] The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens. Scott et al, A Letter To The Right Hon. Edmund Burke, In Reply To His "Reflections On The Revolution In France, Etc." (Printed for J. Sheppard, G. Burnet, P. Wogan, P. Byrne, W. Sleater, B. Dugdale, J. Boyce, W. McKenzie, H. Colbert, J. Moore, J. Jones, J. Halpen, C. Lewis, W. Corbet, A. Grueber, W. Jones, G. Draper, R. White, H. Watts, J. Miillken [sic], J. Rice, and D. O'Brien, 1791) The United Nations General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Treaty Series, vol. 999 article, 6. Thomas, William P Baumgarth and Richard J Regan, On Law, Morality, And Politics (Hackett, 2002) United Nations General Assembly, Declaration of the high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the rule of law at the national and international levels, 67th sess, GA Res 88, UN Doc A/RES/67/1 United Nations General Assembly, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all: Report of the Secretary-General, 59th sess, GA Res 44/45, UN Doc A/59/2005 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR. Žižek, Slavoj, "Against Human Rights" (2005) 34(34) New Left review